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tions in the field. It is complemented with a lucid appendix on 
voting paradoxes. Unfortunately, it is not well fitted into the main 
model. Only very rare students will see any connection between the 
"system" discussion in Chapter 1 and the decision theory in Chapter 
2. Frohock does contrast "rational"9 and "sociological" approaches 
to policy analysis. But the integration that is now possible, on the 
basis of a rather rich literature from comparative policy analysis, is 
not provided. Hypothetical examples of dubious fit are employed 
instead. 
In his choice of real examples, Frohock presumes excessively upon 
the detailed information brought to the classroom by most 
undergraduates. Alas, without additional background informa- 
tion, few will recognize the names of Caryl Chessman, Gary 
Gillmore, or -sadly -Raskolnikov. 
Despite its deficiencies as a textbook, scholars in the field should 
not overlook this volume. There are moments of brilliance in the 
explication of examples. Frohock's summary of crime research, the 
arguments about affirmative action, and his survey of blacks' and 
women's movements are profound. The erudition is further 
enhanced by the fact that Frohock writes the English language with 
grace and agility. 
The treatment of ethics, justice, and democratic theory in the last 
two chapters should be read by our students. John Rawls and his 
respondents are well-summarized. Democratic theory is brought, 
with dignity, back into the most rapidly growing subfield of our 
discipline. Policy analysis and political philosophy have too long 
been estranged. Frohock has shined a light on the back-alley affair 
of recent years and brought it much nearer to a properly consum- 
mated remarriage. 
RICHARD I. HOFFERBET 
State University of New York -Binghamton 
Law, Legislation and Liberty: [Volume 3] The Political Order of a 
Free People. By F, A. HAYEK. (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1979. Pp. xv, 244. $14.00.) 
The Political Order of a Free People is the third and final volume of 
Law, Legislation and Liberty. Along with the two earlier in- 
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stallments, Rules and Order (1973) and The Mirage of Social Justice 
(1976), it is intended as a supplement to Hayek's statement and 
defense of the principles of liberal constitutionalism, The Constitu- 
tion of Liberty (1960). As a whole, Law, Legislation and Liberty 
sets out to expose the conceptual and practical incoherence of the 
most powerful contemporary challenges to limited government, 
primarily those posed by the friends of the planned welfare state and 
of unchecked majority rule. This final volume culminates in 
Hayek's proposals for fundamental institutional reform; these pro- 
posals, which take the form of a model constitution, are not in- 
tended as immediate practical recommendations but rather as "in- 
tellectual emergency equipment" (152) to be held in reserve against 
the possibility of a future in which the flawed constitutional edifice 
of the 18th century architects of liberalism can no longer withstand 
the corrosive pressures of unchecked majoritarianism. 
Hayek's liberalism is not uncommon in its conception of the 
proper role of government. The only proper use of public coercion 
is the protection of individual property, understood in the broad 
Lockean sense of life, liberty and estate -Hayek typically refers to 
individual "domains." (111) But his theoretical defense of 
liberalism is not so easily categorized, being at the same time 
unremittingly secular and utterly distinct from any Lockean or 
Nozickian commitment to a theory of natural rights of individuals. 
Instead, Hayek's central premise seems to be the claim that the 
liberal market order is the result of an unplanned yet directional 
process of human cultural evolution from the rules of primitive 
tribal communalism to a social order governed by a shared commit- 
ment to something very like David Hume's principles of procedural 
justice: abstinence from the property of others, the sanctity of con- 
tract, and the transmission of property by consent. Hayek's evolu- 
tionary theory bears important and acknowledged resemblances to 
those of Burke, Adam Smith, and Hume, and is perhaps most like 
Hume's in its apparently unqualified affirmation of the superiority 
of the abstract and open society of liberal modernity to the face-to- 
face familial order of antiquity. Seen from Hayek's perspective, 
socialism and nationalism are not only self-defeating, but are in fact 
powerful atavisms (165) which draw their strength from the 
biological inheritance which cultural evolution seeks, as it were, to 
overcome in the interests of civilization and progress. 
According to The Political Order Of A Free People, the mistake 
made by 18th century constitutionalists was their assumption that 
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majority rule could provide a sufficient institutional defense of the 
principles of Humean justice. But we now see, Hayek tells us, that 
the coercive power of government has been captured, not by the ma- 
jority as such, but by organized interest groups which demand serv- 
ices in exchange for votes without any regard for the procedural 
rules of advanced liberal society. Interestingly, his analysis here 
looks very much like that often made by leftist critics of liberal 
democracy; Hayek's response to the dilemma, however, is not to 
seek means of political education to develop what for him would be 
a regressive civic virtue, but rather to imagine institutional devices 
for removing from government the power to satisfy the demands of 
organized groups. This inquiry, like Hayek's political theory as a 
whole, lacks neither loose ends nor considerable interest. 
STEPHEN G. SALKEVE, Bryn Mawr College 
Federalism: Failure and Success: A Comparative Study. By URSULA 
K. HicKs. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Pp. 
ix, 205. $19.50.) 
A recent book by Rufus Davis (The Federal Principle, 1978) asserts, 
"The subject (of federalism) has indeed fallen on hard times." Davis 
noted further "the minimal returns of comparative studies and the 
growing disinclination of many scholars to work with the concept." 
Against this formidable judgment Lady Hicks offers an analysis of 
case studies in which federalism "never materialized," was "short- 
lived," was a "total failure," followed a "long road," resulted from 
"decolonisation," is represented by "two successful federal systems." 
Hicks sees two types of federal organization, coordinate and 
cooperative. She observes, "In the modern world federal systems 
have largely abandoned the coordinate model in favour of 
cooperative federalism in which the relations of Centre and State 
are much closer." Regardless of form and shifts, however, Hicks 
contends, "In all forms the central problem is intergovernmental 
relations: economic, political, and social." She subdivides these 
relations into "economic-financial" and "political-administrative." 
These two categories, or themes, are faithfully reflected in the case 
studies, but they become sub-themes to a larger motif, socio- 
historical. In Hicks's words, "Only by studying the past history of 
